Behind the Qatari Investment Narrative, There is a Growing Shadow
One of alliances, ideological export, and unchecked influence
Following President Trump's carefully choreographed "royal courtship" tour of the Middle East—where dissenting voices in the Gulf and abroad were absent—it's time to debunk a few myths I heard about Qatar's gas export strategy and growing geoeconomic influence.
The presidential state visit to Doha, coupled with the recently concluded Qatar Economic Forum (May 20–22), marked a symbolic moment of triumph for Emir Tamim Al Thani. Qatar has not only recovered from the 2017–2021 Gulf blockade—it has emerged stronger, both economically and politically. Now, as the country accelerates its LNG expansion—with a 43% capacity increase planned by 2026-2028—annual revenues from LNG alone could average $45 billion by the end of this decade, assuming oil prices remain around $70 a barrel and gas prices in Europe and Asia stabilize below their 2022-2023 peaks but do not collapse. And that’s even before a potential additional 40% capacity increase in the following decade. QatarEnergy’s revenues surged to $42.5 billion in 2022 on the heels of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, but have since declined in 2023 and 2024 as global energy prices eased. Bloomberg estimates that Qatar’s full expansion will add more than $30 billion annually to state revenue, “making a very wealthy country even richer”.
But with this concentration of wealth in the hands of a single ruling family, Western scrutiny will inevitably intensify. How and why Doha channels this financial and soft power abroad—through investment, diplomacy, and influence campaigns—deserves far more attention. This is a topic I raised in January 2024 in my Barron’s op-ed “Qatar’s Energy Powerhouse Raises Difficult Geopolitical Questions.”
Just as Europe and the US have worked to curb Russia’s energy revenues since the onset of the Ukraine war—aiming to constrain Moscow’s ability to fund a prolonged conflict—it is time for the West to confront the implications of Qatar’s rulers’ engineering of its “silent takeover.” Unchecked financial and soft power could shape open societies in ways that quietly erode democratic norms. “The flying grift” is just one illustration, many others are more covert and latent.Myth #1: “When the Conflict in Ukraine Started, Europeans Desperate for Non-Russian Gas Turned to Qatar”
In fact, Europeans turned primarily to the USA for LNG, not Qatar. Since the war began, Qatar has continued delivering 70–80% of its LNG to Asia, not Europe. This trend has only intensified since 2024, as Houthi-related risks in the Red Sea have pushed Qatari cargos to further prioritize China, South Asia, and other long-term buyers in Asia over rerouting to Europe. In the first 4 months of 2025, the US exported 80% of its LNG to Europe and Qatar exported 80% to Asia (according to SynMax Leviaton data).
Qatar did not rush to the rescue of Europe by redirecting flexible volumes to the gas-hungry region. Instead, Qatar bargained hard and held back supply to Europe until new long-term contracts were signed. QatarEnergy announced multi-decade, multi-billion-dollar gas agreements with TotalEnergy, Shell, and Eni, all European companies in October 2023. Meanwhile, Qatar has been strengthening its relationship with China, with ~25% of Qatari supply heading to China. That represents a hedge against dependence on the US.
Myth #2: “US and Qatari LNG Won’t Compete for Market Shares”
The remapping of LNG trade flows—redrawn since the start of the Russia–Ukraine war—has split global markets: US LNG now predominantly flows to the Atlantic basin, while Qatari LNG continues to supply the Pacific. This intra-regionalization of trade among trusted partners has so far limited direct competition between the two. The vacuum left by Russian gas in Europe has benefited both exporters.
However, if Asia once again becomes the premium market for a sustained period—and if chokepoints like the Panama Canal or Bab el-Mandeb are resolved—US LNG could shift back toward Asia, directly competing with Qatari volumes. Moreover, should Russian pipeline gas regain market share in Europe, the region won’t be able to absorb the same level of US LNG. In that scenario, US cargoes could be displaced or cancelled—especially once Qatar completes the first phase of its LNG expansion.
Qatari expansion and pre-FID US projects are also competing for long-term customers. The Chinese LNG demand eldorado has suddenly given way to a new battleground: energy-hungry data centers, which both exporters are racing to supply, including in Asia.Myth #3: “Qatar’s Foreign Investment, Progressive Diplomacy and Benevolent Generosity Come Without A Price Tag”
Qatar’s growing geoeconomic clout warrants increased scrutiny and clarification from Doha on:
🔹 The depth of its strategic partnership with Iran. A tacit alliance between Qatar and Iran has deepened over the years, as the two countries share the world’s largest gas field. This cooperation could provide Iran with significant gas-export revenues without risking further Western sanctions.
🔹 Support for political Islam — Qatar’s financial ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, along with its influence operations in France and broader Europe, continue to raise concerns.
🔹 Its financial sway over US institutions. Generous donations to elite universities and think tanks have given Qatar soft power leverage in Washington. As documented in FP’s "How Qatar Bought America," this influence extends well beyond philanthropy.
The French intelligence services presented to President Macron this week a timely declassified report on the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence, citing Qatari financing — a sign that these concerns are gaining traction in European policy making circles. It underscores how concealment strategies and foreign funding—often funneled through endowment funds and real estate holdings—have been used as a tool of influence. While Qatar Charity no longer directly funds NGOs and Islamic centers aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood in France, more than a dozen of other Qatari organizations have assumed this mission.
The report confirms that Qatar has facilitated the “penetration” of France’s civil society, with the aim of shaping political discourse and decision-making at the grassroot and city levels. This influence undermines France’s Republican values, social cohesion, and the principle of secularism.
I am singling out France here, but the pattern is the same in many Western countries. Qatar has already invested over €25 billion in France across strategic sectors including energy (notably a 3% stake in TotalEnergies), real estate, luxury hospitality, and media. Its ownership of Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) and significant donations to elite institutions reflect a broader pattern of influence through economic soft power. As journalist Georges Malbrunot, co-author of The Qatar Papers, told France 24: “Qatar’s substantial foreign investments are primarily tools of influence, enabling it to push back when criticized—by, for example, threatening to withdraw its billions in investments.”
By acting as the godfather of the Muslim Brotherhood in France and buying influence at all levels of decision-making, Qatar has undermined the fabric of French society-- a reality that should prompt serious reflection on what could unfold in the US if Doha’s influence remains unchecked.