A Transatlantic LNG Deal Requires a New Financing Arm
Why LNG Could Be the Sweet Spot in Transatlantic Negotiations
At a time when Europeans and Americans are seeking common ground to scale down their tariff war, direct European investment in US LNG export plants could offer a win-win path forward. The US administration is focusing on accelerating permitting to unleash more “American liquid gold” by the end of the decade—but financing remains the biggest hurdle. Meanwhile, Europe may attempt to curry favor with the Trump administration by investing billions in US energy infrastructure—creating American jobs and closing trade deficits while securing long-term, reliable supply for European markets.
Why LNG Could Be the Sweet Spot in Transatlantic Negotiations
In both the US and Europe, there are no traditional state-owned energy companies or sovereign wealth funds capable of making investment decisions based on energy security or geopolitical strategy—rather than strictly economic returns. A new EU investment arm could fill this gap.
Both sides need to ease trade tensions and find areas of convergence. LNG is a logical candidate—the US has abundant supply, and Europe still needs to keep Russian gas at bay.
Assuming the EU continues to negotiate as one bloc, rather than as individual member states, a bold, joint investment commitment into US LNG infrastructure—via a new EU financing vehicle—could help unlock a broader deal and resonate with Washington.
The US Needs Committed Investors to Bankroll New LNG Projects
The US can appear at a disadvantage when competing with state-backed players to finance export infrastructure. There is no “Americaprom” (in reference to Russia’s Gazprom to borrow Dr. Benjamin Schmitt’s term mentioned in the Energy Vista podcast) to self-fund projects or leverage sovereign credit ratings like QatarEnergy.
Instead, American developers—especially smaller, unrated independents—must meet stringent financing requirements and structure projects that reassure private capital markets. In another Energy Vista episode, Tarek Souki articulates this challenge explaining at length the US LNG business model (check out the clip below).
Adding to this pressure: construction costs for LNG export projects have surged, while financing models remain unchanged. For example, Louisiana LNG Phase 1 will cost ~$16 billion, yet the financial toolkit for project sponsors has barely evolved. Trade wars and inflation could further elevate costs.
To support the next wave of US LNG projects, the US government will likely:
Welcome direct equity investments from Asian and Middle Eastern importers—but also from Europeans, who can use investment as diplomatic capital and a lever to reduce trade deficits.
Explore financial support mechanisms, such as tax credits, tariff exemptions (e.g., on imported steel), or DOE-backed programs for capital-intensive equipment.
Whether the world needs more US LNG around 2030—beyond projects already built or under construction—is a valid debate on market fundamentals which can be the topic of another report. But in my opinion, from a geopolitical standpoint, continued investment in OECD countries like the US remains preferable to further wealth concentration in autocratic, non-transparent, gas-rich nations such as Qatar or Russia (read more on “Qatar’s energy powerhouse raises difficult geopolitical questions” in my op-ed).
Europe Needs Reliable, Long-Term US Supply
The US-Europe LNG corridor remains one of the world’s busiest:
In 2024, 52% of US LNG exports landed in Europe (including the UK and Turkey).
US LNG accounted for approximately 21% of all European gas imports (pipeline + LNG).
In Q1 2025, Europe’s US LNG imports rose 15% year-on-year according to SynMax Leviaton data, partly due to the halt in Russia-Ukraine gas transit.
To enhance long-term energy security, the EU could create a sovereign fund to co-finance American LNG projects and other energy infrastructure abroad. Following the Japanese model (e.g., JBIC, JOGMEC), a dedicated EU vehicle could offer preferential loans, public guarantees, and assist with securing direct equity stakes in US gas and LNG ventures.
The Japanese government helps projects with debatable margins reach FID, understanding that strategic energy security outweighs short-term financial returns. Europe may need to adopt a similar mindset—especially if the goal is to avoid overreliance on declining suppliers or weaponized trade routes.
Now that Europe is entertaining a serious defense budget, energy security could fall under this umbrella. In that context, paying a premium for US LNG could be politically and strategically justifiable. Energy security has a price. And maybe NATO could find a renewed raison d’etre in anchoring transatlantic energy security.
What Would Europe Get in Return?
A seat at the table: By holding equity US liquefaction plants, Europe could gain some influence in exports’ decision-making.
Additional contractual safeguards: These could ensure Europe is prioritized—even when Asia becomes a more profitable export market.
Such a move would also signal goodwill in the trade war, offering tangible investment into US infrastructure rather than mere diplomatic or rhetorical promises.
So, who’s ready to make a deal—President Trump and President von der Leyen?